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Editorial 
 
On academic production and the politics of inclusion 
Sara Kendall ∗ 
 
Before the 2015 annual meeting of the European Society of International Law, 
participants were notified of a Ôwomen in international lawÕ happy hour for 
exchanging ideas on Ôthe improvement of representation of womenÕ.1 At the convivial 
and well-attended event in Oslo, organisers thanked the men who were present, 
remarking that their support was not only welcomed but also necessary. This theme of 
inclusion resurfaced in side conversations about past conference panels on gender that 
noted the supportive role of senior male academics in audiences comprised primarily 
of women. Gender was mainly discussed along a single axis of male/female rather 
than intersectionally.2 Other categories of identity, such as ethnicity and nationality, 
remained to the side of this event, which focused on the role of women within the 
field.3 
 
These themes of gender and inclusion appeared familiar, in part because they spoke to 
an earlier era of concerns around academic knowledge-production. Work across 
multiple fields throughout the 1990s and the new millennium  Ð including ethnic 
studies, womenÕs studies, queer theory, postcolonial theory and critical legal studies Ð
has advanced rich critiques of scholarship as a site of ideological reproduction. For 
over two decades, scholars approaching international law from feminist perspectives 
have argued for greater representation of women within the field.4 More recent work 
has noted that mainstream scholarship has insufficiently engaged with feminist 
approaches, with the risk that they remain islanded within the broader field or that 
they are co-opted and stripped of emancipatory potential.5 If representation within 
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1 <http://www.jus.uio.no/pluricourts/english/news-and-events/events/2015/2015-09-11-women-
il.html>. 
2 For a pioneering account of intersectionality, defined as the Ôintersection of race and genderÕ, see K. 
Crenshaw, ÔDemarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:  A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist PoliticsÕ, 140 The University of Chicago 
Legal Forum (1989) 139. On the perils of Ôuncritical, liberal, feminist positioning with little capacity to 
recognize its own hegemony and privilegeÕ, see F. N Aolin, ÔAdvancing Feminist Positioning in the 
Field of Transitional JusticeÕ, (2012) 6 IJTJ 205, at 206. 
3 I use the term ÔfieldÕ rather than ÔdisciplineÕ, following Martti KoskenniemiÕs observation that 
international law is more accurately viewed as an argumentative practice rather than as Ôa set of 
theoretical or technical propositionsÕ; M. Koskenniemi, ÔLaw, Teleology, and International Relations: 
An Essay in CounterdisciplinarityÕ, (2011) 26 International Relations 3. 
4 See for example H. Charlesworth, C. Chinkin and S. Wright, ÔFeminist Approaches to International 
LawÕ, (1991) 84 AJIL 613; D. Dallmeyer (ed.), Reconceiving Reality: Women in International Law 
(1993). 
5 D. Otto, ÔThe Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International Law over the Last 
DecadeÕ, (2009) 10 MJIL 11. See also H. Charlesworth, ÔTalking to Ourselves: Should International 
Lawyers Take a Break from Feminism?Õ in S. Kouyo and Z. Pearson (eds.) Between Resistance and 
Compliance? Feminist perspectives on international law in era of anxiety and terror (2011); H. 
Charlesworth, ÔFeminist Ambivalence About International LawÕ, (2005) 11 International Legal Theory 
1. For a novel attempt at redressing the Ôabsence of a feminist narrativeÕ from contemporary 
international law has remained an issue for women, as the Oslo event suggests, what 
might be said of other categories of identity, and of scholars based outside central 
geographical spaces of scholarly production? In this sense the event prompts broader 
reflections on the composition of the community producing international legal 
scholarship. It marks the shifting state of the field in some European contexts, 
characterised by desires for greater inclusion and anxieties about embedded pass 
structures.  
 
Yet these concerns with inclusion beg further questions about the frame where 
inclusion is sought. If contemporary European scholars of international law reflect 
upon the representation of women, welcoming the necessary support of male 
counterparts long after two decades of feminist critique, what might this reveal about 
enduring structures and presumptions within international law? Are they so 
entrenched that they may not be adequately unsettled and rethought through a politics 
of inclusion? As a political project, the push to extend the field may re-inscribe and 
shore up existing hierarchies in international law, as the ÔnecessityÕ of male academic 
support in the above example appears to suggest. Inclusion takes arrival within the 
frame as its objective without questioning the ontology of the frame itself, which 
harbours traditions of knowledge-production and dominant approaches that may 
accompany membership within it.  
 
Here inclusion not only considers matters of identity and participation. It may also 
refer to subject matter and scholarly approach, such as the disciplinary orientations 
and sites that form part of international legal scholarship. In past decades a growing 
body of work has paid greater attention to the field in historical context, and insights 
from the sub-field of international legal historiography carry implications for how 
international law is evaluated and practiced. Important work over the past two 
decades has pointed out the inheritance of colonial structures within the international 
legal order as well as the dominance of Western epistemologies.6 Interpretive schools 
such as Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) now have multiple 
generations of associated scholars and established spaces of academic production. 
 
Contributors to LJIL have taken up some of these research agendas, illustrating how 
international law was imbricated with colonial logics that informed ideas of 
sovereignty, statehood, territoriality, and the formation of the current international 
economic order.7 Such insights raise questions about how the contemporary field of 
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international legal scholarship on the Treaty of Westphalia, see Y. Otomo, ÔHer proper name: a 
revisionist account of international lawÕ, (2014) 2 London Review of International Law 149. 
6 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law (2005); B. S. Chimni, 
International Law and World Order (1993); M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations:  The 
Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (2004). See also Upendra BaxiÕs review of AnghieÕs text 
and Gerry SimpsonÕs Great Powers and Outlaw States:  Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal 
Order (2004):  U. Baxi, ÔNew Approaches to the History of International LawÕ, (2006) 19 LJIL 555. 
7 For some examples, see U. Natarajan, ÔCreating and Recreating Iraq:  Legacies of the Mandate 
System in Contemporary Understandings of Third World SovereigntyÕ, (2011) 24 LJIL 799; R. Parfitt, 
ÔEmpire des Ngres Blancs: The Hybridity of International Personality and the Abyssinia Crisis of 
1935-36Õ, (2011) 24 LJIL 849; M. Burgis, ÔTransforming (Private) Rights through (Public) 
International Law:  Readings on a ÒStrange and Painful OdysseyÓ in the PCIJ Mavrommatis CaseÕ 
(2011) 24 LJIL 873; M. Fahkri, ÔThe 1937 International Sugar Agreement:  Neo-Colonial Cuba and 
Economic Aspects of the League of NationsÕ; (2011) 24 LJIL 899; U. zsu, ÔDe-territorializing and 
Re-territorializing Lotus:  Sovereignty and Systematicity as Dialectical Nation-Building in Early 
international law is produced and disseminated: by whom, through what conduits of 
power, and toward what ends. Yet alternate approaches could remain peripheral 
unless the broader field is recast in light of their contributions, with shifts in how 
international law is conceptualised and interpreted in central sites of scholarly 
production. 
 
LJIL continues to offer a space for critical perspectives and other disciplinary 
methods in exploring the boundaries of international legal scholarship. The journal 
enjoys a plural identity, taking up doctrinal developments within the field and its 
institutions as well as theoretical debates.8 It also builds upon a history, pioneered by 
past editors, of recognising the importance of critical approaches.9 Through a series of 
special issues of its Articles section on the theme of ÔInternational Law and the 
PeripheryÕ, for example, the journal explored the work of two scholars Ôfrom regions 
conventionally cast as ÒperipheralÓ to the discipline's metropolitan ÒcentreÓÕ;10 the 
role of scholars on the Indian subcontinent in shaping international law; and the 
(re)constitution of the periphery through the work of the League of Nations. LJIL has 
featured work that draws upon approaches from history, political theory, and 
international relations; schools of thought such as post-structuralism, postcolonial 
theory and actor-network theory; and thinkers including Foucault, Girard, Gramsci, 
Levinas, and Marx, among many others. 
 
How is this work perceived in relation to traditional international legal scholarship? 
Critical scholars may be viewed by more doctrinal members of the scholarly 
community as Ôsitting on the wall, looking inÕ, as one LJIL editor recently argued.11 
Yet the idea of a wall itself begs further questions about the fieldÕs ontology and its 
limits. What is its material form:  the constellation of leading journals, conferences, 
and spaces of institutional practice? How might alternate sites of production 
contribute to further walling the field; for example, could the rise of blog-based 
commentary shore up the authoritativeness of certain locations and individual 
scholars?12 Who polices the terrain of international legal scholarship, and who 
remains outside its borders? 
 
ÔSitting on the wallÕ in this doctrinally oriented account, the non-doctrinal scholar is 
compared to a patient of a mental institution unable to recognise his institutional 
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Republican TurkeyÕ, (2009) 22 LJIL 29; V. Nesiah, ÔPlacing International Law: White Spaces on a 
MapÕ, (2003) 16 LJIL 1.  
8 See T. Aalberts, ÔThe Politics of International Law and the Perils and Promises of InterdisciplinarityÕ, 
(2013) 26 LJIL 503. 
9 See for example T. Skouteris, ÔFin de NAIL: New Approaches to International Law and its Impact on 
Contemporary International Legal ScholarshipÕ, (1997) 10 LJIL 415. 
10 F. Johns, T. Skouteris and W. Werner, ÔEditorsÕ Introduction: India and International Law in the 
Periphery SeriesÕ, (2010) 23 LJIL 1; F. Johns, T. Skouteris and W. Werner, ÔThe League of Nations 
and the Construction of the PeripheryÕ, (2011) 24 LJIL 797. 
11 D. Jacobs, ÔSitting on the Wall, Looking in: Some Reflections on the Critique of International 
Criminal LawÕ, (2015) 28 LJIL 1. Many scholars would not self-identify as engaging in the work of 
critique, and here I use the term broadly to refer to non-doctrinal international legal scholarship, though 
it is also possible to engage critically with doctrine. The former may interrogate the assumptions 
embedded in the field, whereas the latter is concerned with improving international law within its own 
terms.  
12 LJILÕs own editorial practice could be subjected to similar criticism; like blog-based commentary, it 
does not rely upon vetting through anonymous peer review. 
position, thus blurring Ôthe boundaries of the internal and externalÕ.13 This metaphor 
of the mental patient, located at the boundaries of the field, appears to illustrate 
positioning in relation to positive law, which re-inscribes the centrality of the 
doctrinal legal form as an ordering principle or norm.14 Here ÔdevianceÕ appears in 
relation to doctrinal analysis. Yet one might imagine the international legal field 
differently:  as a conception of social order, for example, or as a conception of justice, 
where a different type of analysis Ð whether sociolegal or philosophical Ð would set 
the normative terms of scholarly engagement from which doctrinal analysis itself 
would then deviate. This account of the wall reveals particular presumptions about the 
centrality of doctrinal analysis in contemporary international legal scholarship, which 
new participants or approaches must then address themselves to:  as critical or 
alternate epistemologies deviating from the normative pull of doctrine.15 
 
Rather than focusing on the ambivalent positioning of critical scholars, one might turn 
this around, as Maria Aristodemou does in a provocative article in the European 
Journal of International Law, where the field of international law itself becomes the 
object of an analytic Ð indeed psychoanalytic Ð gaze.16 Why, Aristodemou asks, does 
the field compulsively look outward beyond itself? What anxieties does it continue to 
harbour, and what might we learn from them? 
 
AristodemouÕs account also begins from a patient, but one who sits on an analystÕs 
couch rather than on a wall bounding a field of scholarly production. Drawing upon 
the work of psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, Aristodemou applies LacanÕs own analysis 
of a clinical case regarding an academic unable to publish his own work for fear of 
plagiarising the work of others.17 The patient perennially sought Ôfresh brainsÕ Ð 
sources of inspiration outside himself Ð much like international law seeks inspiration 
from new or different domains of knowledge. Aristodemou argues that international 
law appears as Ôthe neurotic patient hankering after Òfresh brainsÓ that she believes 
she will find in other disciplines, be they religion, economics, history, politics, 
literature or, now, psychoanalysis.Õ18  
 
The turn to other fields of knowledge has preoccupied international law for some 
time, offering a counterpoint to doctrinal analysis. As an LJIL editorial recently 
observed, Ôthe disenchanted belief in the determinacy of legal rules has opened legal 
inquires up towards perspectives and insights from other disciplines.Õ19 Such a 
framing suggests that international law was previously enchanted by determinacy, and 
the fieldÕs neurotic desire for Ôfresh brainsÕ may mark its failure to come to terms with 
its own unsettling indeterminacy: of rule-application, of premises that may prove 
contradictory, and of the role of the interpreting subject. The neutrality of doctrinal 
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13 Jacobs, supra note 11, at 3.  
14 On normalisation, see M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison (1977).  
15 For an alternate (non-doctrinal) account of international law, see A. Carty, Philosophy of 
International Law (2007). 
16 M. Aristodemou, ÔA Constant Craving for Fresh Brains and a Taste for Decaffeinated NeighboursÕ, 
(2014) 25 EJIL 35. 
17 The patient was not LacanÕs own, but rather that of ego psychologist Ernst Kris, who Lacan felt had 
fundamentally misunderstood the patientÕs case. For a description of the case and AristodemouÕs 
argument more broadly, see supra note 16 at 36-38. 
18 Supra note 16 at 37. 
19 I. Venzke, ÔInternational Law and its Methodology:  Introducing a New Leiden Journal of 
International Law SeriesÕ, (2015) 28 LJIL 186. 
analysis has been contested, and legal method appears not as a science but rather as an 
argumentative practice.20 The Socratic concern with truth has been displaced by the 
sophistic interest in argumentation, moving from the determinate realm of fixed forms 
to a contingent art of rhetoric.21  
 
Here the loss of determinacy appears much like Friedrich NietzscheÕs account of the 
loss of the metaphysical realm, the so-called Ôdeath of godÕ, where international law 
moved from a belief in the Ôreal world, attainable to the wiseÕ, to an unattained and 
also unknown (or unknowable) Ôreal worldÕ, with Ôno consolation, no redemption, no 
dutyÕ.22 Put another way, the internal tensions harboured within modern law itself Ð
between autonomy/social contingency and stability/historical responsiveness Ð pose a 
fundamental challenge to the belief in the determinacy of legal rules.23 One might 
read international lawÕs turn to other disciplines as a neurotic search for a new 
universal value or method to stand in for this loss. 
 
What can fill the void left in the wake of such a loss? In her work on the rise of 
empiricism in twentieth-century scholarship, legal theorist Marianne Constable has 
argued that some scholars sought to fill modern lawÕs post-foundational void by 
turning to Ôsocial realityÕ and its ÔscientificÕ forms, such as sociology and political 
science.24 There may be some comfort in believing that law can be rendered scientific 
and calculable, a discipline drawing upon established methodologies rather than 
shifting context-bound approaches. It would seem that the turn to Science and Method 
in international law suggests a desire for certainty:  for re-crafting a narrative that can 
compensate for the crumpled mythology of the fieldÕs pacific origins, now seen as 
Eurocentric and harbouring undue faith in progressive potential and universalist 
conceits.25 If some core principles remain too important to abandon, such as sovereign 
equality, the field requires some ground upon which to reconstruct and retain them 
lest they persist as foundational myths. It would seem that the prospect of a ÔneutralÕ 
scientific approach offers consolation to a field adrift in a post-foundational era 
characterised by indeterminacy and fragmentation.26 
 
Here AristodemouÕs account offers a diagnosis. International law, she writes, must be 
lead Ôto finding out the bloody histories that constituted it as a subjectÕ so that it may 
ultimately ÔÒget over itselfÓÕ.27 Many critiques of the field fall within these two forms:  
first, those that illustrate its Ôbloody historyÕ, its Eurocentrism, and its continuing 
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20 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia:  The Structure of International Legal Argument (1989). 
21 See generally Plato, Gorgias (trans. Jowett, 2009), where Socrates deplores the Sophists for teaching 
argumentation as a ÔknackÕ rather than an art, privileging persuasive skills over the philosophical 
search for truth. See also Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric (trans. Lawson-Tancred, 1992). As 
Koskenniemi observes, as an argumentative practice, international law offers a plurality of responses to 
circumstances and must ultimately draw upon extra-legal forms for their resolution; the resolution is 
not internal to international law itself. See supra note 20. 
22 F. Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ (trans. Hollingdale, 1968), 40-41. 
23 For an account of these tensions, see generally P. Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law (1992), 
preface. 
24 M. Constable, ÔGenealogy and Jurisprudence:  Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of 
LawÕ, (1994) 19 Law and Social Inquiry 551. See also R. Berkowitz, The Gift of Science: Leibniz and 
the Modern Legal Tradition (2005). 
25 T. Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse (2009). 
26 On the fragmentation debates in international legal scholarship, see A. C. Martineau, ÔThe Rhetoric 
of Fragmentation:  Fear and Faith in International LawÕ, (2009) 22 LJIL 1. 
27 Aristodemou, supra note 16, at 37. 
Ôdynamic of differenceÕ,28 and second, those seeking to show how it is not a panacea 
for global problems, whether by proliferating juridical frameworks or through 
advancing paradigms of international criminal accountability.29 The answer to 
indeterminacy is not to be found in greater refinement of legal science and an 
elevation of Method Ð by seeking Ôfresh brainsÕ from elsewhere, such as social 
scientific empiricism and the rise of indicators and metrics.30 Yet forms of response 
may emerge through more critical reflection on international lawÕs origins and limits, 
which does require it to look outside itself:  to history, to critical and postcolonial 
theory, to philosophy, and to alternate conceptions of justice. The former approach 
would craft a new deity, such as scientific rigour, to replace the lost idol of 
determinacy. The latter suspends the search for a singular resolution, and instead 
draws upon other approaches to help bring to light the fieldÕs constitutive violence 
and contemporary presumptions, which aid in diagnosing the field rather than offering 
a cure. 
 
Instead of seeking Ôfresh brainsÕ from elsewhere, one might read this turn to other 
approaches as essential to thinking through the fieldÕs constitutive violence. 
International law is neither ahistorical nor purely doctrinal. Certain philosophical and 
ethical presumptions have accompanied it from its emergence, and in this sense 
historical and philosophical accounts are not foreign, but instead form part of the 
fieldÕs internal development. Rather than Ôsitting on the wallÕ, then, the critical 
scholar who draws upon historical material to critique the fieldÕs troubled origins and 
contemporary limits is retrieving an alternate conception of a field that cannot be 
restricted to doctrine or the lure of empirical certainty. 
 
Many international legal scholars and practitioners acknowledge that international law 
cannot resolve complex global problems, and they are well aware of the political 
constraints that it faces. Few would argue that resource disputes in African states 
could be definitively resolved through international arbitration, for example, or that 
the main political architects of the 2003 invasion of Iraq will be brought before an 
international court or tribunal. Meanwhile, critical scholars face claims that they 
produce caricatures of mainstream positions. The boundaries of critical scholarship 
are porous and contested, and there is a risk, as Immi Tallgren observes, that self-
described critical scholars perform the very things that they fault elsewhere:  
Ôconstructing blind alleys of expertise and ownershipÕ and elevating new universal 
truths and false idols in place of those they have unsettled.31 
 
Furthermore, it may be that the chasm between orthodox and critical international 
legal scholarship is not as wide and deep as it may appear, and shifts within the field 
are leading to an integration of some critical approaches into scholarship and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Anghie, supra note 6. AnghieÕs account of the present manifestations of international lawÕs colonial 
history still appears to allow the possibility of a redemptive role for the field; see S. Kendall, ÔBook 
Review: Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International LawÕ, (2008) 4 Law, Culture and 
the Humanities 119. 
29 See the Journal of International Criminal Justice Symposium on ÔGlobal JusticeÕ, edited by Sarah 
Nouwen and Wouter Werner, (2015) 13 JICJ 73. 
30 S. E. Merry, ÔMeasuring the World:  Indicators, Human Rights and Global GovernanceÕ, (2011) 52 
Current Anthropology 83. 
31 I. Tallgren, ÔWho are ÒweÓ in international criminal law? On critics and membershipÕ, in C. 
Schwbel, Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law:  An Introduction (2014), 71. 
pedagogy through the changing content of handbooks and textbooks.32 The field has 
already taken up many insights from outside doctrinal legal analysis. It will certainly 
benefit from continued reflection on its privileged views and approaches, and on ways 
of navigating the tension between desires for internal coherence and the political call 
for greater inclusion. 
 
Part of this work requires considering how the international legal community is 
composed and a critical account of its walling practices. The importance of broader 
representation in legal scholarship is revealed through how international law bears 
upon everyday life, from the effects of international development regimes at the local 
level to responses to International Criminal Court interventions in conflict-affected 
communities.33 In practice, the international legal field is not exclusively a matter of 
concern to those participating in the production of Ôexpert knowledgeÕ in locations 
such as The Hague, Geneva, and New York as well as in Anglophone and 
Francophone scholarly communities based primarily in the global North. It also 
informs the terms through which responses to global problems are articulated, 
received and contested. Greater engagement with the work of scholars who can offer 
a more varied set of views is important for epistemological as well as ethical reasons:  
epistemologically, in order to better understand how international law refracts and is 
received in different contexts, and ethically, to address the privileging of certain 
accounts to the exclusion of others.  
 
Gaining admission to the conversation has been traditionally tied to demonstrating a 
grasp of international legal doctrine, and this remains an influential way of reinforcing 
the boundaries of the field. Doctrinal analysis continues to make substantial 
contributions by identifying interpretive gaps and innovations internal to international 
legal jurisprudence, but observers have increasingly noted the limits of treating law in 
isolation from social contexts. Doctrinal analysis alone cannot answer questions about 
the historical and political conditions of international lawÕs production, yet 
supplementing doctrine with an empirical research agenda will not render the field 
more ÔscientificÕ, value-free, or methodologically unified. This is in part because 
international law has multiple identities:  as a technical discourse or form of 
argumentation, as a field of power operating upon bodies and territories, as an 
emancipatory ideal (and practice), as a community of scholarly production.  
 
Orthodox international legal scholarship often neglects or disavows the aggressions 
and exclusions that have accompanied the field since its emergence. Greater inclusion 
of alternative accounts may contribute to producing a more informed and reflexive 
field of knowledge. Yet a politics of inclusion harbours its own risks, such as shoring 
up dominant legal forms through extending the frame of international law to what was 
previously excluded or marginalised. To what extent can this international legal 
frame, whether read as a wall of doctrinal orthodoxy or as a Eurocentric field tied to a 
colonial past, adapt to alternate modes of understanding what international law is and 
does? 
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32 See for example B. Fassbender and A. Peters (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of the History of 
International Law (2012), particularly chapters by M. Craven and L. Obregn; see also the introduction 
of J. Crawford, BrownlieÕs Principles of Public International Law (2012), which updates a previous 
edition of the text to include a discussion of Eurocentrism and colonial history. 
33 L. Eslava, Local Space, Global Life (2015) and C. De Vos, S. Kendall and C. Stahn (eds.), Contested 
Justice: the Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions (2015). 
 
As new critical sites emerge in international legal scholarship, LJILÕs role in 
cultivating widened participation and openness to novel approaches will face 
challenges as the journal seeks to maintain its identity as a space for developing 
innovative lines of inquiry as well as rigorous doctrinal analysis. To this end, the 
journal continues to welcome contributions that prompt rethinking and renewed 
engagement with issues of power, identity, and representation. More fundamentally, it 
may offer a space for reconceptualising the international legal order, and for exploring 
strategic decisions about whether to engage in critical projects from within or outside 
the frame.  
 
 
 
